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Preface
This thesis is intended to serve as a basis for a manual for logical annotation
of the content of utterances and texts in natural language. This difficult and
complex task requires from the annotator to understand the text he or she
annotates. The representation may seem similar to the tectogrammatical
representation as described in Sgall, Hajičová and Panevová [20] and many
modalities used in this formalism (described in chapter 6) come from node at-
tributes and functors as specified in Panevová, Hajičová and Sgall [13]. Nev-
ertheless, this approach has several substantial differences from the Prague
Dependency Treebank described in Hajič et al. [6]. The annotation described
in this work is an annotation of another level. It tries to depart from linguis-
tic meaning and to annotate the import to the ontological reality behind the
words and propositions. Since this task seems impossible in a direct manner
(for instance, what should be the ontological representation of the verb to
shave?), we must remain in the domain of words but on the other hand to
take advantage of the understanding peculiar to the annotator and connect
the content of an utterance with the knowledge of the world represented by
the preceding discourse. On the other hand the logical representation should
be language-independent. That’s why we must distinguish different meanings
of words – we always assign a ‘meaning index’ when using a word.
We will try to build a kind of ‘semantic network’ that will reflect the
relationships between objects, events and propositions introduced in the text.
Such a network should be an instantiation of Saussure’s [19] idea that the
content of a word is being delimited only by contents of other words and
there can be no content of a language unit as such. This very property of
language seems to deny any ontological annotation but still we will try to
capture at least some spatial and temporal properties and various references,
either direct or indirect.
In all cases the annotator should follow the content of the sentence. The
syntax should help to draw a structure but it should never become the main
measure of what is the right annotation, because as Karcevskij [8] notes,
“the forms and the functions substantially slide over the slope of the reality.
ix
Each of them exceeds the frame determined by its partner.” In this thesis
I don’t describe the relationship between the semantic annotation and the
syntax. Further inquiry can possibly find some interesting relations, but first
we will need the annotation to be able to build a system that could learn
the transformation “text → logical representation”. The final ambition of the
annotation should be that two texts expressing the same content will receive
the same annotation.
The annotator should at first become familiar with the syntax and seman-
tics of hybrid logic introduced in chapter 1. Then he or she can look at the
examples in chapters 7 and 8 and find there the problems described in this
thesis solved (or, at least, demonstrated). There is an hypertext version of
this document available on the Internet1, where the reader can easily switch
between the examples and the theoretical chapters.
Note the conventions in this text:
Nominals are written as j, j21 , volitive.
Propositional symbols are written sans serif as John1, be1, tall.




Introduction to hybrid logic
The multimodal hybrid logic is the base for the approach presented in this
thesis. Therefore I will briefly present modal logic as the kernel of hybrid
logic, then I will discuss the multimodal logic, which is a natural extension of
modal logic. In the third section we will hybridize the modal logic and in the
last section I will show how to extend the hybrid logic to the multimodal hy-
brid logic in the same fashion as the modal logic was multimodalized. Readers
familiar with multimodal and hybrid logics can skip to the section 1.4.
The evolution of logic was simultaneous in two directions. Here at first I
add some more modal labels and then hybridize, but the other way works as
well:



























'& %$ ! "#Hybrid multimodal logic
1.1 Modal logic
Definitions in this section are adapted from Blackburn [5].
1.1.1 Syntax
Let’s first define the syntax of basic (propositional) modal logic.
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Definition 1 (Formula of modal logic) Given a set of propositional sym-
bols PROP = {p, q, p′, q′, . . .}, the set of well-formed formulas of the basic
propositional modal language (over PROP ) is defined to be:
WFF := p | ¬φ | φ ∧ ψ | φ ∨ ψ | φ→ ψ | 3φ | 2φ, (1.1)
for all p ∈ PROP and φ, ψ ∈ WFF .
1.1.2 Semantics
The basic modal language is interpreted on models. A model M (for a
fixed choice of PROP ) is a triple (W,R, V ). Here W is a non-empty set of
states and R is a binary relation on W . The pair (W,R) is called the frame
underlying M, and M is said to be a model based on this frame. V (the
valuation) is a function with domain PROP and range Pow(W ); it tells us
at which states each propositional symbol is true. Interpretation is carried
out as follows:
Definition 2 (Semantics of modal logic) Let M = (W,R, V ) and w ∈
W . Then:
M, w |= p iff w ∈ V (p),where p ∈ PROP
M, w |= ¬φ iff M, w 6|= φ
M, w |= φ ∧ ψ iff M, w |= φ and M, w |= ψ
M, w |= φ ∨ ψ iff M, w |= φ or M, w |= ψ
M, w |= φ→ ψ iff M, w 6|= φ or M, w |= ψ
M, w |= 3φ iff ∃w′ ∈ W : (wRw′ & M, w′ |= φ)
M, w |= 2φ iff ∀w′ ∈ W : (wRw′ ⇒ M, w′ |= φ).
(1.2)
If M, w |= φ we say that φ is satisfied in M at w. If φ is satisfied at all
states in all models based on a frame F , we say that φ is valid on F and
write F |= φ. If φ is valid on all frames, then we say that it is valid and
write |= φ.
This system is nowadays familiar to most logicians, but it is important to
keep in mind that the models are not only“worlds” linked by an“accessibility
relation” modelling necessity, possibility, and belief. Modal logic is broader
than this. Models may be viewed as trees representing the content of utter-
ances. The nodes are represented by states from W and edges are represented
by the relation R. The meaning (or semantic import) of an utterance is the
change of the graph (i.e. the change of the model).
But to represent real-world sentences we will need more than one relation
and a tool for referring to states in the model. Let’s add some more relations
to our system.
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1.2 Multimodal logic
Multimodal logic is the modal logic extended by changing relation R into a
set of relations {Rπ}.
1.2.1 Syntax
Definition 3 (Formula of multimodal logic) Given a set of propositional
symbols PROP = {p, q, p′, q′, . . .} and the set of modality labels MOD =
{π, π′, π′′, . . .}, the set of well-formed formulas of the basic propositional mul-
timodal language (over PROP and MOD) is defined to be:
WFF := p | ¬φ | φ ∧ ψ | φ ∨ ψ | φ→ ψ | 〈π〉φ | [π]φ, (1.3)
for all p ∈ PROP , π ∈MOD and φ, ψ ∈ WFF .
1.2.2 Semantics
Definition 4 (Semantics of multimodal logic) A model M (for a fixed
choice of PROP and MOD) is a triple (W, {Rπ, π ∈ MOD}, V ). Here
W is a non-empty set of states and Rπ are binary relations on W . The
pair (W, {Rπ}) is called the frame underlying M, and M is said to be a
model based on this frame. V (the valuation) is a function with domain
PROP and range Pow(W ); it tells us at which states each propositional
symbol is true. Interpretation is carried out as follows: Let M = (W, {Rπ, π ∈
MOD}, V ) and w ∈ W . Then:
M, w |= p iff w ∈ V (p),where p ∈ PROP
M, w |= ¬φ iff M, w 6|= φ
M, w |= φ ∧ ψ iff M, w |= φ and M, w |= ψ
M, w |= φ ∨ ψ iff M, w |= φ or M, w |= ψ
M, w |= φ→ ψ iff M, w 6|= φ or M, w |= ψ
M, w |= 〈π〉φ iff ∃w′ ∈ W : (wRπw′ & M, w′ |= φ)
M, w |= [π]φ iff ∀w′ ∈ W : (wRπw′ ⇒ M, w′ |= φ).
(1.4)
This definition is very similar to the modal version, but this little difference
enables us to start representing the discourse.
John loves Mary. (1.5)
We can try to interpret sentence 1.5 as a model that is specified in 1.6:
1.3 Hybrid logic 4
PROP = ∅
MOD = {Actor,Patient}


















This is a very basic example of the structure we will try to assign to
utterances. Now it is so simplified that it recalls a simplified TR know from
Sgall [20]. But we need something more to be able to refer in a simple
manner to states in our system. Why the multimodal logic isn’t sufficient for
knowledge representing:
1. Even in this simple example 1.5 we are not able to represent the mean-
ing of the sentence as a formula. We would like to say that the meaning
of 1.5 is something like
M, love |= ( 〈Actor〉 John
& 〈Patient〉 Mary) (1.8)
The problem is that this is not a formula.
2. Another problem is definability of classes of frames1. As Blackburn
in [4] pointed out, we cannot define irreflexivity of a modality π using
orthodox multimodal logic—we can not express the fact that for every
state w ∈ W : M, w |= ¬ 〈F〉 w. The respective hybrid formula will be
shown in example 1.13 on page 7.
Let’s proceed to the Hybrid logic described in the next section.
1.3 Hybrid logic
In this section I will introduce the definition of basic hybrid language H(@) as
presented in Areces and Blackburn [1], which is a sublanguage of the H(↓,@).
The mutual relationship and properties of H(↓,@) and H(@) are discussed
in Areces, Blackburn and Marx [2].
1A formula φ defines a class of frames F iff φ is valid on all the frames in F and falsifiable
on any frame not in F.
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1.3.1 Syntax
Definition 5 (Formula of hybrid logic) Let PROP be a set of propo-
sitional symbols PROP = {p, q, p′, q′, . . .} and NOM a set of nominals
distinct from PROP , NOM = {i, j, k, . . .}. The set of well-formed formulas
of the basic hybrid language (over PROP and NOM) is defined to be:
WFF := i | p | ¬φ | φ ∧ ψ | 3φ | @iφ (1.9)
for all p ∈ PROP , i ∈ NOM and φ, ψ ∈ WFF .
Nominals are the principal hybrid mechanism for referring to points, thus
they play the role played by terms in classical logic. But note: nominals
are formulas, not terms. Further, nominals can occur as subscripts to the
@ symbol. Such a combination—for example, @k—is called a satisfaction
operator.
1.3.2 Semantics
The basic hybrid language is interpreted on models. A model M (for a
fixed choice of PROP ) is a triple (W,R, V ). Here W is a non-empty set
of states and R is a binary relation on W . The pair (W,R) is called the
frame underlying M, and M is said to be a model based on this frame.
V (the hybrid valuation) is a function with domain PROP ∪ NOM and
range Pow(W ); it tells us at which states each propositional symbol is true
and for all nominals V (i) is a singleton set. That is, nominals are true at
precisely one point in any model. They ‘name’ this point by being true there
and nowhere else. We call the unique point in V (i) the denotation of i.
Interpretation is carried out as follows:
Definition 6 (Semantics of hybrid logic) Let M = (W,R, V ) , i ∈ NOM
and w ∈ W . Then:
M, w |= p iff w ∈ V (p),where p ∈ PROP
M, w |= ¬φ iff M, w 6|= φ
M, w |= φ ∧ ψ iff M, w |= φ and M, w |= ψ
M, w |= 3φ iff ∃w′ ∈ W : (wRw′ & M, w′ |= φ)
M, w |= i iff w is the denotation of i.
M, w |= @iφ iff M, u |= φ, where u is the denotation of i (u ∈ V (i)).
(1.10)
If M, w |= φ we say that φ is satisfied in M at w. If φ is satisfied at all
states in all models based on a frame F , we say that φ is valid on F and
write F |= φ. If φ is valid on all frames, then we say that it is valid and
write |= φ.
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Notes:
1. The satisfaction operator @i shifts the point of evaluation to the deno-
tation of i. So @iφ says: “φ is satisfied at the point named by i.”
2. The formula prefixed by a satisfaction operator can itself be a nominal.
For example @ij is a well formed formula and it has a useful meaning:
it asserts that the nominal j is true at the point named by i, i.e. i and
j name the same point.
Now we are ready for the last step to Multimodal hybrid logic.
1.4 Multimodal hybrid logic
Multimodal hybrid logic is the hybrid logic extended by changing relation R
into a set of relations {Rπ}.
1.4.1 Syntax
Definition 7 (Basic hybrid multimodal language H(@)) Given a set of
propositional symbols PROP = {p, q, p′, q′, . . .} and a set of modality labels
MOD = {π, π′, π′′, . . .}. Let NOM be a nonempty set of nominals, disjoint
from PROP and MOD. Typically, elements of NOM are written as i, j, k.
We define the basic hybrid multimodal language H(@) (over PROP , MOD
and NOM) to be the set of well-formed formulas such that:
WFF := i | p | ¬φ | φ ∧ ψ | φ ∨ ψ | φ→ ψ | 〈π〉φ | [π]φ | @iφ. (1.11)
for all i ∈ NOM , p ∈ PROP , π ∈ MOD and φ, ψ ∈ WFF . For any
nominal i, we call the symbol sequence @i a satisfaction operator.
1.4.2 Semantics
Definition 8 (Semantics of hybrid multimodal logic) A model M (for
a fixed choice of PROP , MOD and NOM) is a triple (W, {Rπ, π ∈MOD}, V ).
Here W is a non-empty set of states and Rπ are binary relations on W . The
pair (W, {Rπ}) is called the frame underlying M, and M is said to be a model
based on this frame. V (the hybrid valuation) is a function with domain
PROP ∪ NOM and range Pow(W ) such that for all nominals i, V (i) is a
singleton subset of W . We call the unique state in V (i) the denotation of i.
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Interpretation is carried out as follows: Let M = (W, {Rπ, π ∈ MOD}, V ),
w′ ∈ W and w ∈ W . Then:
M, w |= p iff w ∈ V (p),where p ∈ PROP
M, w |= ¬φ iff M, w 6|= φ
M, w |= φ ∧ ψ iff M, w |= φ and M, w |= ψ
M, w |= φ ∨ ψ iff M, w |= φ or M, w |= ψ
M, w |= φ→ ψ iff M, w 6|= φ or M, w |= ψ
M, w |= 〈π〉φ iff ∃w′ ∈ W : (wRπw′ & M, w′ |= φ)
M, w |= [π]φ iff ∀w′ ∈ W : (wRπw′ ⇒ M, w′ |= φ).
M, w |= i iff w ∈ V (i),where i ∈ NOM.
M, w |= @iφ iff M, w′ |= φ,where w′ is the denotation of i.
(1.12)
If φ is satisfied at all states in all hybrid models based on a frame F, then
we say that φ is valid on F, which we can write as F |= φ. If φ is valid on
all frames, then we say that it is valid and write |= φ.
With this modification of modal logic we can define the irreflexivity of a
relation F . It can be expressed by following schema of axioms from Black-
burn [4]:
@i¬ 〈F〉 i (1.13)




NOM = {l1, j1,m1}
W = {w1, w2, w3}
R=
(




(l1, {w1}), (j1, {w2}), (m1, {w3}),
(love1, {w1}), (John1, {w2}), (Mary1, {w3})
)
(1.14)
Note that the meaning of ‘John1’ and ‘Mary1’ is now different. While in
1.6 John was a state, now it is the set of all Johns. The image corresponding
to 1.14 could be 1.15:


















Mary1 holds (also) here
j1
John1 holds (also) here
(1.15)
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What is important about this approach is that now we can represent the
semantic import by the formula 1.16 in hybrid multimodal language H(@):
@l1(love1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (j1 ∧ John1)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (m1 ∧Mary1)
)
(1.16)
What does formula 1.16 say?
1. The propositional symbol love1 holds in the state labelled by l1.
2. (l1, j1) ∈ RActor and John1 holds at j1.
3. (l1,m1) ∈ RPatient and Mary1 holds at m1.
Now it’s clear that this is what figure 1.15 shows. This formalism enables
us to represent the same objects of discourse with the same nominals and also
provides us with the possibility to link occurrences of objects, events, states
or whatever else together. The complete annotation of 1.5 can be found on
the page 86.
The approach here is to capture the objects of discourse as nominals –
they can be easily referred to and we can use them even for entities we don’t
know much about. If, for example, two actions happen at the same place, we
can call the place p1 and capture the connection of those actions even if we
have no idea where p1 can be. The nominals itself don’t tell us anything about
the nature of the entities they represent – they are useful for referencing. On
the other hand the propositional symbols like John1 or table1 don’t identify
any entities, they are used for characterising the entities. We could say they
ascribe a property.
We use this division for distinguishig what we can annotate well from what
we can annotate worse. From the text we can quite precisely understand and
annotate the relations between the entities of the world introduced by the
text, but in the characterisation of the entities we can not get much further
beyond the words (if the speaker calls an action ‘running’, what do we really
know about it?).
The relations between entities and the entities itself can be viewed and
treated as language-independent, but what about the“words”? All we can do
is distinguish clearly different senses of the words by different indices – this is
what we will do. But we can not count upon an“ontological”or“interlingual”
dictionary because there is no such as explained in the Preface, we will use
the words from the original language of the text. Nevertheless we call the
approach language-independent – we hope that annotations of the same text
1.4 Multimodal hybrid logic 9
in different languages will lead to the same structure that will differ only in
the “labels” of entities. In that case we could then use machines to learn the
mapping of these “labels” from one language to another depending on their
position in the structure and on the “labels” of neighbouring entities.
Now let me introduce another two simplified examples, the first is about
the direct linking and the second shows how to set up an indirect link between




In this case the annotator knows who are the people referenced by ‘she’
and ‘him’. The connection can be formalized by 1.18:
@l1 (love1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (j1 ∧ John1)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (m1 ∧Mary1)
)
@h1(hate1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (m1 ∧ she1)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (j1 ∧ he1)
)
(1.18)
In the next example the reference is revealed too late to represent it in
such a direct manner:
John talked about Mary while somebody knocked on the door.
It was her.
(1.19)
In this case the annotator can’t reduce the first sentence to ‘John talked
to Mary while she knocked on the door.’ The reference is thus represented
indirectly. Note that the temporal aspects are ignored for the sake of sim-
plicity.
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@t1 (talk1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (j1 ∧ John1)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (m1 ∧Mary1)
)
@k1(knock1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (s1 ∧ somebody1)




∧ 〈Patient〉 (m1 ∧ she1)
)
(1.20)
The annotator could simply replace the third formula by @s1(m1 ∧ she1)
but this would reduce the sentence and furthermore if the discourse had
continued like ‘No, it was not her!’, such sentence would be impossible to




2.1 Segmentational potential of
sentential boundaries
When an annotator works with a discourse, he or she surely has to divide
the text into relatively small units and annotate them sequentially. Consider
following examples:
Mary travels a lot. John loves her. (2.1)
Mary travels a lot and John loves her. (2.2)
These two texts differ in style but the ontological content of both texts is the
same. We would like to have the same logical representation for both texts
but this can be hardly done in case we have each text segmented in different
manner, although in the section 2.2 I will show that sometimes the hybrid
logic itself can help us to segment the text properly. At first glance we can
find out two ways of unifying the approach to discourse segmentation. We
can either make the segments as long as possible, or we can divide the text
into units as small as possible. It’s obvious that we can not follow the first
way, since we would get the whole discourse as one unit and that would be
too complicated to annotate at once.
Therefore I propose to divide the discourse into segments as short as
possible. Now the question is ‘What is the minimal size of discourse to be a
single unit?’ In the next section I will try to use the notion of ‘proposition’
to divide the text into formulas, but even now it’s obvious that the sentence
boundary is a point where we will draw the boundary between the formulas.
In fact the proposition will correspond mostly to clausal boundaries.
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2.2 Proposition as the logical measure
To annotate a piece of discourse into a formal representation, the annotator
has to divide the text into propositions. Every proposition should correspond
to a fact proposed by the speaker. Consider the sentence
The book you are standing on is my favourite Havĺıček’s novel. (2.3)
It can be segmented in two rather extreme ways. In the first case, the
whole sentence is represented by a single formula as in 2.4:
@i1(be1







∧ 〈NB〉 b1 ∧ 〈NB〉 s1
∧ 〈Stime〉 t1
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 t1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈P〉 t1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (n1 ∧ novel1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (h1 ∧ Havĺıček1)
∧ 〈App〉 x1
∧ 〈Rstr〉 (f1 ∧ favourite1)
)




∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
(2.4)
In the second case, the sentence is as fragmented as possible:




∧ 〈NB〉 b1 ∧ 〈NB〉 s1
∧ 〈Stime〉 t1
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 t1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈P〉 t1)









∧ 〈NB〉 n1 ∧ 〈NB〉 h1 〈NB〉 f1
∧ 〈Stime〉 t1
∧ 〈Etime2〉 t1










The formulae in 2.5 could be rephrased as 2.6:
You are standing . . . on something.
It’s a book,




Now the key observation here is that 2.4 is logically equivalent to 2.5!
This is exactly what we want—the content delivered by the utterance should
be independent of how the speaker divides it into clauses and sentences. Note
that the order of formulas is not important. All permutations of formulae
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are equivalent. The order of the discourse is maintained solely by the order
of STimes.
The formalism itself provides us with a natural segmentation of the facts
proposed by the speaker. Still, there is a problem: We want to keep track
of who said which proposition, who was the hearer, where and when the
utterance took place. This could be easily represented by modals Speaker,
Hearer and Stime. The question is however, where to place these modals.
To every formula? Whenever anything changes? We will follow the rule
‘Place such pragmatic information to every event’. And at the same time I
propose to segment the text into formulae on the basis of clausal1 boundaries.
In this way the pragmatic information will be always at the same place as
temporal information as described in chapter 3.
On one hand the segmentation doesn’t matter but on the other hand it is
convenient to have segments together with pragmatic information. Therefore
the representation of 2.3 would be 2.7:
1 I will place a segment boundary also between ‘potential clauses’ as in sentence repre-
sented by 7.14 and 7.15 on page 72.







∧ 〈NB〉 b1 ∧ 〈NB〉 s1
∧ 〈Stime〉 t1
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 t1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈P〉 t1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
@i1 (be1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (b1 ∧ book1)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (n1 ∧ novel1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (h1 ∧ Havĺıček1)
∧ 〈App〉 x1
∧ 〈Rstr〉 (f1 ∧ favourite1)
)




∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
(2.7)
Note that not all segments necessarily have identifiable stage (speaker,
hearer and time). But even if we don’t know such information, we should
introduce a new nominal for later reference.
The Stime relation identifies the time of the utterance, but more events
can share the same Stime. We should assign the same Stime to those events
that can be permutated without a negative impact on the smoothness of the




In this chapter I will discuss the temporal aspect of utterances and how it
can be represented in a way compatible with the formalism introduced in
chapter 1
3.1 Event nucleus
According to Moens and Steedman [11] (page 18), temporal ontology of verbs
can be modelled by a structure called event nucleus.
Definition 9 (The event nucleus) An event nucleus is defined as a struc-
ture comprising a culmination, an associated preparatory process, and a con-
sequent state. Any or all of these elements may be compounds of another
events.


































Every verb occurrence can be classified into an aspectual type. Steedman
distinguishes1 four types:
1Categories like activity and accomplishment are ways of viewing a happening, rather
than intrinsic properties of verbs and the associated propositions, or of objective reality
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1. Activity is what Moens and Steedman in [11] call ‘process’ and Steed-
man in [21] calls ‘activity’. Activity is extended in time, but it doesn’t
result in a very distinct change in the world. An example could be
Mary is swimming. (3.2)
Porota přicháźı. (3.3)
“The jury is coming.”
2. Achievement is described in [21] as being instantaneous and by re-
sulting in a distinct change in the state of the world. An example:
Keats has finnished the sonnet. (3.4)
Water has reached the top. (3.5)
3. Accomplishment is a composite of activity and achievement which is
brought about by the activity:
Samedi au soir, il a couri au bal. (3.6)
“Saturday evening, he ran to the ball.”
In ca. 3 Stunden werden wir den Gipfel erreichen. (3.7)
“In approx. 3 hours we will reach the summit.”
4. State describes an indefinitely extending states of affairs. Typically,
the states are expressed by verbs like understand, love, know, . . . .
The aspectual type of a proposition depends strongly on the situation
in which the verb is used. The same verb can be classified to several types
depending on its tense, its modifiers, and the context.
For example ‘reach’ is a verb, which expresses achievement, but in 3.8 the
proposition conveyed by the verb is an accomplishment:
It took him three hours to reach the summit. (3.8)
The sentence does not say that the act of reaching the summit took three
hours. It rather expresses the duration of the preparation associated with
this event.
In my view the aspectual category of a verb occurrence can not be clearly
distinguished as the annotator doesn’t know what can be understood as in-
stantaneous and what is a“distinct” change in the world. Kruijff [9] mentions
an example 3.9 (example 53 in [9]):
and the external world.
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{
Activity: Kathy walked.
Accomplishment: Kathy walked till dawn.
(3.9)
Since the first sentence is an activity, it should not bring any distinct
changes to the world. On the other hand, the accomplishment is a composite
of an activity and an achievement and an achievement should describe a
distinct change in the state of the world. In my opinion there is no reason to
say that the latter sentence results in a more distinct change than the former.
Nevertheless the annotator should keep in mind that verbs sometimes
express events that have two important time anchors (the beginning of the
preparation and the culmination point) and sometimes events that have only
one time anchor (the time in which the event simply took place). We will
not classify events to Steedmans’ aspectual types, instead, we will use two
temporal relations Etime1 and Etime2.
• Etime1 anchors the beginning of the accomplishment, activity or state.
• Etime2 anchors the time of culmination, time of achievement or the
end of an activity or the end of a state.
In case the annotator needs only one anchor, he or she should use Etime2
(the point of achievement). Examples on temporal problems are described
in sections 3.1.2 and 3.3.
Now, here is the example 3.8 annotated as 3.10:
@r1(reach1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (h1 ∧ he1)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (s1 ∧ summit1)
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime1〉 e1






∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
(3.10)
Note that the HowLong modality (if used as a modifier of an event)
determines the time between Etime1 and Etime2. In examples 3.24, 3.25
and 3.27 you can see different usages of HowLong.
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The relation F is the future relation, it originates in Prior [17]. @x 〈F〉 y
means:“From x you can go to future to y” (in other words: x precedes y).
The inverse relation is P.
3.1.2 Referring to event nucleus
In this section I present several examples that illustrate different kinds of
temporal reference. These examples are from section 3.3.3 of Kruijff [9] but
partially originate in Steedman [21].
In all these examples the relative clause establishes a reference point for
the main clause to refer to anaphorically.
When Elijah took Kathy’s pawn, she took his queen. (3.11)
In this case the relative clause precedes the main clause. This can be
represented as 3.12.
@t1(take1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (e0 ∧ Eliah1)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (p1
∧pawn1
∧ 〈Appurtenance〉 (k1 ∧ Kathy1)
)
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈NB〉 e0 ∧ 〈NB〉 t1 ∧ 〈NB〉 p1
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
@t2(take1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (k1 ∧ she1)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (q1
∧queen1
∧ 〈Appurtenance〉 (e0 ∧ he1)
)
∧ 〈Stime〉 (s2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈F〉 s2 ∧ 〈P〉 e1)
∧ 〈NB〉 t2 ∧ 〈NB〉 q1
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
(3.12)
The act of taking the pawn take place in e1 ( 〈F〉 s1 means that from e1
we can go to future and we will find s1—the speech time). The act of taking
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queen took place in the time e2, which is sooner than the utterance but later
than e1.
When Eliah took Kathy’s pawn,
he did not know it was protected by one of Kathy’s knights.
(3.13)
In this example, the event in the main clause happens in the same time
as the event in the relative clause. The representation follows:
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@t1 (take1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (e0 ∧ Eliah1)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (p1
∧pawn1
∧ 〈Appurtenance〉 (k1 ∧ Kathy1)
)
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈NB〉 e0 ∧ 〈NB〉 t1 ∧ 〈NB〉 p1




∧ 〈Actor〉 (e0 ∧ he1)
∧ 〈Patient〉 p2
∧ 〈Stime〉 (s2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s2)
∧ 〈NB〉 p2
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
@p2(protect1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (k2 ∧ 〈ElementOf〉 (k3
∧knight1
∧ 〈Extent〉 plural
∧ 〈Appurtenance〉 (k1 ∧ Kathy1)
))
∧ 〈Patient〉 (p1 ∧ it)
∧ 〈Stime〉 (s3 ∧ 〈P〉 s2)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s3)
∧ 〈NB〉 p2 ∧ 〈NB〉 k2
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
(3.14)
The nominal e1 is used in both events to represent the temporal relation-
ship.
When Elijah took Kathy’s pawn, he used a rook. (3.15)
This example shows that the main clause can refer not only temporarily
but rather to the whole event in the relative clause. Consider 3.16 as a
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representation of 3.15:
@t1 (take1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (e0 ∧ Eliah1)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (p1
∧pawn1
∧ 〈Appurtenance〉 (k1 ∧ Kathy1)
)
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈NB〉 e0 ∧ 〈NB〉 t1 ∧ 〈NB〉 p1
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
@u1(use1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (e0 ∧ he1)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (r1 ∧ rook1)
∧ 〈Stime〉 (s2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s2)
∧ 〈NB〉 r1 ∧ 〈NB〉 u1




These two events are not linked only by common time e1 but also by the
formula in the last row.
When Eliah won his only game against Kathy,
he used the John Wayne opening.
(3.17)
In example 3.17, the reference point established by the relative clause
doesn’t precede the main clause’s. The second sentence refers to the prepa-
ration of the event in the first sentence. It is reflected in the annotation:
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@w1(win1




∧ 〈HowOften〉 (o0 ∧ once1)
∧ 〈Addressee〉 (k1 ∧ Kathy1)
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime1〉 e1
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈NB〉 e0 ∧ 〈NB〉 w1 ∧ 〈NB〉 g1 ∧ 〈NB〉 o0
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
@u1 (use1




∧ 〈Actor〉 (j1 ∧ John1 ∧Wayne1)
)
∧ 〈Stime〉 (s2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s2)
∧ 〈NB〉 u1 ∧ 〈NB〉 o1
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
(3.18)
The time of the act of using the opening turns up in the beginning of
the winning described in the first clause. Note also that the structure of the
representation of the first clause differs from the syntactic structure. First,
there is the word ‘against’ which can be a dependent of either ‘won’, or
‘game’. In my interpretation this difference is not important and I place as
a rule such ambiguous modifiers towards the event.
The other expression is ’only’. Semantically the HowOften dependency
relation fits more to the event itself than to the word ’game’.
3.2 Temporal formalization
To recapitulate section 3.1.2, we will use relations Etime1 and Etime2
to anchor the beginning resp. the end of the event. When the event is
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instantaneous, we will use only the relation Etime2 – the achievement point.
The Etime1 anchor can be added later, see also example 3.63 on the page 38.
When we annotate the beginning and the end of an event, it does not
mean that the event is permanently in progress between the two points. If
we know about a point in which the event is in progress, we will use the
When relation (see also example 3.68 on the page 39).
To simplify the annotation we will suppose these schemata of axioms:
@a 〈F〉 b→ @b 〈P〉 a
@b 〈P〉 a→ @a 〈F〉 b
(3.19)
This is the mutual inversion of P and F. The choice between them will
depend on the point we are in. If we are in a point x from which it is possible
to go to the future to a point y, we will write 〈F〉 y instead of the more
complicated @y 〈P〉 x.
( 〈Etime1〉 e1 ∧ 〈Etime2〉 e2) → @e1 〈F〉 e2 (3.20)
We will not annotate that the start of an event precedes the end. It is
provided by the rule 3.20.
〈When〉 r → ( 〈Etime1〉 〈F〉 r ∧ 〈Etime2〉 〈P〉 r) (3.21)
This rule ensures that if we know that an event is in progress in a time
r, then it must have started before r and will end after r.
3.3 Reference time
Reichenbach advanced in his [18] the view that, linguistically speaking, tense
does not quantify over two times, like “now”and“then”, but over three times:
the speech time(S), the event time (E), and the reference time (R).
The time S is obviously the time in which the sentence is uttered2. The
event time E is the time (or temporal extension) of the expressed proposition.
Finally, the reference time R is the time (or context) that we are talking
about, or from which point the event E is viewed.
In this section I will show that the reference time (R) is not necessary
for the representation of content. The reference time in a language has only
one function: to temporarily relate two events. From my point of view the
reference time is rather a syntactical means of relating timepoints. We can
relate two time points by the priorian relations P and F3. Each subsection
2We use the relation Stime to annotate the time S.
3See Prior [17] for more about Past and Future operators.
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contains several examples of an English tense and their annotation with no








In case of simple past tense there are only two interesting times, the
reference time is the same as the event time. The Reichenbach’s diagram is
a bit simplifying as the example 3.23 shows:
I lived in Rome for six years. (3.23)
The event lasted for six years and it should be reflected in the annotation.
I present two representations of 3.23: In 3.24 the structure i1 is an interval
representing the time between e1 and e2. Annotation 3.25 is a “shortcut”
for 3.24, because the HowLong relation always relates Etime1 and Etime2.
If we needed relate other times than Etime1 and Etime2, we would use a
structure similar to i1. See such an example 3.27 on page 26.
@l1(live2
∧ 〈Actor〉 x1
∧ 〈Where〉 (r1 ∧ Rome1)
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime1〉 e1
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ @i1( 〈Etime1〉 e1 ∧ 〈Etime2〉 e2)





∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
(3.24)
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@l1(live2
∧ 〈Actor〉 x1
∧ 〈Where〉 (r1 ∧ Rome1)
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime1〉 e1






∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
(3.25)
I saw Jack two days ago. (3.26)
In this example the ‘two days ago’ dependent describes the duration be-
tween the event time and the speech time. It is represented in a way similar
to example 3.23. The difference is that we can not leave the structure i1




∧ 〈Patient〉 (j1 ∧ Jack)
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ @i1( 〈Etime1〉 e1 ∧ 〈Etime2〉 s1)





∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
(3.27)
They met during the war. (3.28)
Example 3.28 introduces a new relation: When. It restricts the time of
the event by the time of the state it leads to. In other words
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1. Since the When relation leads from m1, it refers to the state denoted
by e1. If there was another time Etime1, it would restrict the whole
interval as in e.g. 3.35.
2. Since the When relation leads to w1, the time of w1 is “extracted” from
the state w1 and e1 is intersected with the time of w1.
3. The absence of Etime1 relation from m1 indicates that the annotator





∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈When〉 (w1 ∧ war1)
∧ 〈NB〉 m1 ∧ 〈NB〉 w1










Present simple tense is once again a case of a tense that is not as simple
as the diagram shows. Although it suits to utterances like 3.32, I dare to
say that for most utterances in present simple tense the situation is much
more complex. The tense is used for describing regular activities as in 3.33
or rather atemporal facts as in 8.6 on page 89.
I want a cup of tea. (3.31)
In this example the event time is absolutely unspecified. We don’t know
since when the speaker has wanted the cup or till when he or she will still want
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it. The annotation reflects this intuition. We only know that the proposition
holds at the time of utterance. However, the annotator may decide, in a
particular context, that the event lies completely after the utterance time









∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈NB〉 c1
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
(3.32)
The sun rises in the east. (3.33)
In this example the event time is even less specified than in 3.31, the
event of rising happens at some unspecified moments. From the sentence I
can entail that such event began at least once at a time in the past (e2) and
that it has not ended (the end (e3) of the event or events lies in the future).
@r1(rise1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (s1 ∧ sun1)
∧ 〈Where〉 (e1 ∧ east1)
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e3 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈NB〉 e1
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
(3.34)
I play tennis on Sunday mornings. (3.35)
This is an example of iteration. The e1 is the beginning of the iterative
event and e2 is the end. Between these two moments the action may be
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∧ 〈Patient〉 (t1 ∧ tennis1)
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)




∧ 〈Rstr〉 (s1 ∧ Sunday1)
)
∧ 〈NB〉 p1 ∧ 〈NB〉 m1 ∧ 〈NB〉 t1










The simple future tense is similar to the simple past tense. Only the
relation to the utterance time is inverse.
I will never help you. (3.38)
In this example the





∧ 〈TillWhen〉 (f1 ∧ forever1)
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈NB〉 h1
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
(3.39)
Liverpool are going to win the match. (3.40)
In this example it would be useful to represent that the e1 timepoint is
in the near future to the s1. The problem is that this near future can vary
from a few seconds to several months. This aspect of the utterance is thus
not annotated.
@w1(win1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (l1 ∧ Liverpool2)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (m1 ∧match1)
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈NB〉 w1
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
(3.41)
I’ll have the steak, please. (3.42)
Note the similarity to the example 3.31. However, there are some differ-
ences. This sentence does not speak about the present, the event completely
lies in the future. Note the volitive deontic modality in spite of the fact that
the verb is syntactically declarative.
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@h1(have2
∧ 〈Actor〉 x1
∧ 〈Patient〉 (s1 ∧ steak1)
∧ 〈DeontMod〉 volitive
∧ 〈Stime〉 s2
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈P〉 s2)
∧ 〈NB〉 s1









Past perfect is the first tense that is said to have three distinct times.
But what is the reference time? A speaker can not utter a clause in the past
perfect tense when there is no reference point established in the discourse.
The reference timepoints are the event times of utterances that have occurred
before the use of the past perfect4. Example 3.45 illustrate this:
When I got to the party, Peter had gone home. (3.45)
The first clause introduces the timepoint e1 and the event time in the sec-
ond clause is restricted in the way that it precedes e1. No explicit annotation
of the reference time in g2 could enhance the representation of its content.
4It is not always before, consider an alternative of ex. 3.45: “Peter had gone home,
when I got to the party”. However, such exceptions can be annotated without any need
of reference time, too, while this sentence would receive the same representation as 3.45.
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@g1(get1
∧ 〈Actor〉 x1
∧ 〈WhereTo〉 (p1 ∧ party1)
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈NB〉 g1 ∧ 〈NB〉 p1
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
@g2(go1






∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈F〉 e1)
∧ 〈NB〉 g2 ∧ 〈NB〉 h1 ∧ 〈NB〉 p2
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
(3.46)
I didn’t want to go to the cinema with the others
because I’d seen the film before.
(3.47)
The temporal aspects of this example are similar to the previous one.
This example is interesting because of the relationship between ‘going to
cinema’ in the former clause and ‘seeing the film’ in the latter. This sentence
entails that the cinema played the film (that the speaker had seen) at the
time at which he or she didn’t go there (or at the time he or she went there
if he or she changed his or her mind). The state denoted by p1 represent this
entailment.




∧ 〈WhereTo〉 (c1 ∧ cinema1)
∧ 〈DeontMod〉 volitive
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1












∧ 〈Patient〉 (f1 ∧ film1)
∧ 〈Stime〉 (s2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈F〉 e1)
∧ 〈NB〉 s2






∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
(3.48)







How long have we known Peter? (3.50)
In this question the speaker asks what is the time between e1 – the time
in which they began to know Peter – and s1 – the time of the utterance
(exactly as in the diagram 3.49 the time between ‘(E)’ and ‘S’). The time e2
is the end of knowing Peter, the use of the perfect tense suggests that this
timepoint is after the utterance time.
Note that in my interpretation the speaker includes the hearer to the
group identified by ‘we’ and that in case of question the NB relation has a











∧ 〈Patient〉 (p1 ∧ Peter1)
∧ 〈EventMod〉 interrogative
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈NB〉 l1
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
(3.51)
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How many times has he been married? (3.52)
In this example I suggest to use the HowOften relation to represent a
‘how many times’ expression, because they are semantically near. Sometimes
they are difficult to distinguish5 and the hearer can answer this question with
a ‘how often’ expression appropriately.
@m1(marry1





∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 s1
∧ 〈NB〉 o1
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
(3.53)
I’ve lost my wallet. (3.54)
In this case the use of the perfect tense suggests that the consequences
of the event last. I believe it is a matter of interpretation in the context
whether this sentence entails that the speaker doesn’t have the wallet at the
time of the utterance. If the annotator interprets this sentence as having








∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈NB〉 l1 ∧ 〈NB〉 w1
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
(3.55)
5See example 3.17 on page 22.








∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)









I’ll have it done by tomorrow. (3.58)
Here the annotator must realize that this ‘do’ represents an accomplish-
ment, it is not only an activity. The perfective aspect (culmination) of the
event is reflected in the Extent relation.
Note also the indexical expression ‘tomorrow’. It must be specified to
which timepoint the expression should be associated.
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@d1(do1
∧ 〈Actor〉 x1
∧ 〈Patient〉 (i1 ∧ it1)





















I was reading a book during the flight. (3.61)
Here we want to associate the event of reading to the flight. The flight is
not an event itself, but it doesn’t prevent it from having a temporal extension
described by relations Etime1 and Etime2.
The interpretation 3.62 annotates the ‘during’ expression as two con-
straints:
1. The event of reading a book started after the start of the flight (@e1 〈P〉 f1).
2. The event of reading a book finished before the end of the flight (@e2 〈F〉 f2).
In a real discourse annotation the flight f0 would be already in the stock
of shared knowledge before this utterance.
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@r1(read1
∧ 〈Actor〉 x1
∧ 〈Patient〉 (b1 ∧ book2)
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧@f0(flight1 ∧ 〈Etime1〉 f1 ∧ 〈Etime2〉 f2)
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈P〉 f1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈F〉 f2 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈NB〉 r1 ∧ 〈NB〉 b1
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
(3.62)
When the phone rang, I was having a bath. (3.63)
If we mark the point of ringing as e1 and the event of having bath as
being from e2 to e3, the following representation reflects the intuition that
we can imagine the relationship of these timepoints as e2 // e1 // e3 .
Note that I annotated the event of ringing as instantaneous. It’s because
the speaker presented the ringing in such a way. The annotator can also
introduce a Etime1 point for event r1 but if the annotator finds out the
need for such a time anchor later, he or she can just add such a new point e0
by formula @r1 〈Etime1〉 e0.
@r1 (ring1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (p1 ∧ phone1)
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈NB〉 r1




∧ 〈Patient〉 (b1 ∧ bath1)
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e2 ∧ 〈F〉 e1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e3 ∧ 〈P〉 e1)
∧ 〈NB〉 b1
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
(3.64)
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I was going out with Jack when I first met Harry. (3.65)
This sentence has a temporal scheme very similar to the previous one.
@g1 (go out1
∧ 〈Actor〉 x1
∧ 〈Patient〉 (j1 ∧ Jack1)
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime1〉 e1
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈NB〉 g1 ∧ 〈NB〉 j1




∧ 〈Patient〉 (h1 ∧ Harry1)
∧ 〈Manner〉 (t1 ∧ time2 ∧ 〈Rstr〉 (f1 ∧ first1))
∧ 〈Stime〉 (s2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e3 ∧ 〈P〉 e1 ∧ 〈F〉 e2 ∧ 〈F〉 s2)
∧ 〈NB〉 m1 ∧ 〈NB〉 h1 ∧ 〈NB〉 f1










Don’t turn the TV off. I’m watching it. (3.68)
In the case of the present progressive tense we have one more information
in comparison with the simple present tense. We know not only that the event
started in the past and will finish in the future, but also that it is under
run at the time of the utterance. This is important in case of repetitive
actions. One can say ‘I watch the TV every day’ and this sentence does
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not entail that it is happening at the utterance time. The entailment is
represented as ‘@w1 〈When〉 s2’ – meaning ‘The event w1 is in progress at
the timepoint denoted by s2. When we know that the event was in progress
at the time s2, it is not necessary to write @e2 〈F〉 s2 and @e3 〈P〉 s2,
while this can be inferred automatically. The rule would be 〈When〉 r →









∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈NB〉 t1




∧ 〈Patient〉 (t2 ∧ it1)
∧ 〈When〉 s2




∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
(3.69)
I’m doing a French evening course this year. (3.70)
In this example the only information about the start time e1 is that it is
restricted to the year of the utterance as well as the end time e2. The course
could have started or not at the time of the utterance. On the other hand
the end of the course lies in the future.
Note that the annotator must decide whether the speaker talks about
the calendar year (let’s say year1) or an academic year (e.g. year2). If the
annotator doesn’t know what kind of year it should be, he or she should
create a new propositional symbol yearn+1, where n is the biggest index used
for indexing year.





∧ 〈Patient〉 (f1 ∧ French1)
∧ 〈Rstr〉 (e0 ∧ evening1)
)
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1




∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈Rstr〉 y1 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈NB〉 c1 ∧ 〈NB〉 f1 ∧ 〈NB〉 e0










Here the reference time should be created by the discourse in a manner
similar as in case of past progressive.
Come, I’ll be waiting. (3.73)
In this example the time of ‘waiting’ from e2 to e3 is restricted to begin
before e1 and end after e1. Moreover the event is in progress in the time
e1. The former facts can be inferred automatically from the latter, as in
example 3.68 on the page 39. That’s why the points e2 and e3 in this example
are not explicitly connected to the point e1.





∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈NB〉 c1






∧ 〈Stime〉 (s2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e2 ∧ 〈P〉 s2)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 e3
∧ 〈NB〉 w1






Anaphora solving and reference representation must be an inherent part of
any logical discourse representation. In this chapter I will show how to re-
fer to individuals, individual roles and events by means of hybrid logic. In
section 4.5 I will also show the referring to subsets, supersets and other as-
sociated objects. Basics ideas in this chapter come from DRT as described
in Van Eijck and Kamp [3].
4.1 Referring to a class or group
A group can be referenced in the same way as an individual. In the first
occurrence1 of the group we will assign a new nominal. The group can be
distinguished by having an Extent relation. For example in 7.1 on the
page 65 the expression ‘two sons’ establishes a new group with the extent of
2. If we don’t know the extent so precisely, we can use the reserved plural
nominal, as in 3.36 on the page 29. The extent may be expressed not only
by a number, but also by a quantifier as in 8.7 on the page 89, where the
group s2 is the group of all squirrels, or by a fuzzy numeral as in 8.17 on the
page 94, where the nominal c1 represents the group of many countries.
Sometimes the group is not characterized and it’s only a group of indi-
viduals that eventually had something in common. In this case we use the
relation MemberOf to specify the group. See example 8.5 on the page 88,
where in both interpretations the group s1 is the group consisting of ‘Peter’
and ‘Paul’. These two means of group specification can be combined.
To annotate a reference to a group, we must distinguish between the
reference to the whole group from the reference to its members. This is
1It doesn’t necessarily have to be the first occurrence in the text, it is the first time we
come across the group in the annotational process.
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exactly the difference shown in the example 8.5 on the page 88. In the first
case the Actor is the group while in the second interpretation the members
act.
The reference can be quite complex as in example 8.22 on the page 98.
There we need three nominals:
• t1 for the group referenced by ‘them’. This nominal would be intro-
duced earlier in the discourse under normal circumstances.
• f1 for ‘the five’. The use of the definite article should mean that they
are mentioned before and the nominal should be associated as well as
t1.
• ev1 denotes the actor. It references the members of the group, we could
say it is an iteration over the group.
4.2 Reference by indexical tokens
In this section I will address not only expressions as ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘now’ or ‘here’.
I consider indexical also expressions not directly connected to the situation
of the utterance, but those which don’t have a reasonable sense without
anchoring in a context, such as ’north’, ’last’ or ’this year’.
In the first case we can simply use the nominals introduced by the dis-
course. ‘I’ will get the same nominal as the one in Speaker relation, ’you’ is
the same case for the Hearer relation, ‘now’ can be identified with the time
of speech related by Stime, see chapter 3 for a closer look on annotation of
temporal aspects. ‘here’ can be represented by the speaker.
In the second case we will use the relation Appurtenance to “anchor”
the expression. For example using of ‘this year’ as the specification of the
endpoint of the event n1 can be annotated as:
@n1(
...







A complete example with ‘this year’ can be found on the page 40.
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See also example 8.14 on the page 93 for ‘north’ and 5.11 on the page 55
for ‘last’.
There are some other expressions that are not exactly indexical but need
to be assigned to an object in order to make sense. We should always recog-
nize such expression and add the information not explicitly mentioned in the
sentence. Examples of such expressions could be ‘home’ from example 3.45
on the page 31 and ‘others’ from example 3.47 on the page 32.
4.3 Referring to objects and concepts
The key to the ability to refer back to an entity lies in assigning every object
of the discourse a nominal.
Jaroslav loves Apples.
He could sing all their songs.
(4.2)
In this example, the second sentence refers to ‘Jaroslav’ as an individual
from the first sentence, and also to ‘Apples’, as a concept. The possibility to
refer to these objects is enabled by introducing nominals in the first sentence:
@l1 (love2
∧ 〈Actor〉 (j1 ∧ Jaroslav1)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (a1 ∧ Apples1)
∧ 〈NB〉 j1 ∧ 〈NB〉 a1 ∧ 〈NB〉 l1
∧ 〈Stime〉 t1
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 t1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈P〉 t1)
)
@s1(sing1




∧ 〈Appurtenance〉 (a1 ∧ they1)
)
∧ 〈NB〉 s2 ∧ 〈NB〉 s1
∧ 〈DeontMod〉 facultative
∧ 〈Stime〉 (t2 ∧ 〈P〉 t1)
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e3 ∧ 〈F〉 t2)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e4 ∧ 〈P〉 t2)
)
(4.3)
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Notice two things in this example:
1. The propositional symbol love2 differs from the symbol love1 used in
‘John loves Mary’ (1.16 and later). It was because my interpretation of
the sentence. As the annotator I decided that this love has a different
meaning from the first love and therefore I assigned a new propositional
symbol. If I thought the meaning of love is the same as before, I would
use the same love1.
2. The reference to the individual ‘Jaroslav’ is handled in the same way
as the reference to ’Apples’, because in this case the expression ‘their’
refers to the same entity, but the annotator must be aware of the differ-
ence between an individual and a concept. See example 2.5 on page 13
and note the difference between the physical ‘book’ and the notion of
‘novel’.
4.4 Referring to events and propositions
In the approach introduced in this thesis the events are equated to the propo-
sitions that describe them. This may seem disadvantageous because we can
not refer to a sentence as such, but on the other hand we can still refer to
the content of the proposition. Instead of ‘The preceding sentence is a lie.’,
we can annotate only ‘The content of the preceding sentence is a lie.’ (see
example 8.32 on the page 104.) It is in question whether this can cause any
trouble.
While each proposition is represented by a nominal, it is easy to refer
to. However, it’s important to distinguish real events from hypothetical
events. The latter will receive the EventMod conditional. This modality
should NOT be automatically connected with ‘would’ or any other means of
syntactical modality. The conditional EventMod should be used in case of












It would be nice.
I’m hungry.
I think it’s Jane at the door.
The first and the last sentences are interesting because the syntactical
‘conditional’ doesn’t correspond to our conditional. The first sentence should
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be annotated exactly as example 3.31 on the page 27, it should get the
EventMod declarative and DeontMod volitive.
In the last sentence the utterance consists of two events: the event of
thinking and the event of being at the door. The former needs to refer to the
latter. But the latter is not real, because this sentence doesn’t state that it’s
Jane at the door.
On the other hand consider following sentence:
I’ll go because it’s Jane at the door. (4.4)
In this case again the first event refers to the second (as a Cause) but
this time the second event is real—by this sentence the speaker states that
Jane is at the door.




∧ 〈NB〉 th1 ∧ 〈NB〉 b2
∧ 〈Stime〉 t1
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e11 ∧ 〈F〉 t1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e21 ∧ 〈P〉 t1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
@b2 (be2
∧ 〈Actor〉 (j2 ∧ Jane1)
∧ 〈Where〉 (d2 ∧ door1)
∧ 〈EventMod〉 conditional
∧ 〈NB〉 j2
∧ 〈Stime〉 (t2 ∧ 〈P〉 t1)
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e12 ∧ 〈F〉 t2)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e22 ∧ 〈P〉 t2)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
(4.5)
And here the representation of 4.4:





∧ 〈NB〉 g1 ∧ 〈NB〉 b2
∧ 〈Stime〉 t1
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e11 ∧ 〈P〉 t1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 e21
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
@b2 (be2
∧ 〈Actor〉 (j2 ∧ Jane1)
∧ 〈Where〉 (d2 ∧ door1)
∧ 〈NB〉 j2
∧ 〈Stime〉 (t2 ∧ 〈P〉 t1)
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e12 ∧ 〈F〉 t2)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e22 ∧ 〈P〉 t2)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
(4.6)
For more examples of handling ‘would’ and conditional, see examples 8.35
on the page 106 , 7.17 on the page 74 and 7.27 on the page 79.
4.5 Reference by association
Reference by association is the worst kind of reference for any computational
approach because it relies on the hearer’s (or computer’s) knowledge of the
world. It is not a reference directly to an object or event in the stock of
shared knowledge (SSK). It’s rather the reference to something that is closely
semantically connected to a highly activated item in SSK. The analysis of
items’ activation in SSK can be found in Sgall, Hajičová and Panevová [20].
We will represent such a connection according to its kind. The most often
used relation will probably be Appurtenance. Examples of associative
reference can be:
The flat is nice but the walls need repainting.
When I finally got to the shop, the doughnuts were sold out.
I love Paris. I wish I could be in one of the lovely gardens.
All these examples have one thing in common: the second clause refers
to something in the first clause, but this reference is not explicit. It’s the
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annotator’s knowledge of the world that enables him or her to entail that
the walls are the walls of the flat just mentioned, that the doughnuts were
sold in the particular shop and that “the gardens” are the gardens of Paris.
However for the sake of logical representation it is necessary to represent
such associations because they have essential influence for the content of the
sentence.
To look at some annotated examples of association, see example 3.47 on




In this chapter I address the importance of representing topic-focus articula-
tion (TFA) and its representation.
5.1 Need for TFA
The representation of TFA should be an inherent part of any semantic rep-
resentation for several important reasons:
1. To quote Peregrin [16]: “Different TFA’s lead not only to different
felicity conditions, but to quite different propositions.”
2. To quote Peregrin [14]: “In case of sentences with a generic noun phrase
the subject-predicate structuring that is yielded by the TFA determines
the scope and thus can mean differences not only regarding felicity
conditions, but also regarding truth conditions proper, like in case of
Every man loves a woman.”
3. The TFA has major influence on the stock of shared knowledge.
4. To quote Peregrin [15]: “The TFA pattern triggers an existential pre-
supposition connected with the topic, and it gives the focus a certain
claim of exhaustiveness of the significant.”
The importance of the TFA for the meaning of a sentence is described in
detail also in Hajičová, Panevová and Sgall [20].
In the following example 5.1 the person C must have placed the intonation
centre on the word ‘Lisa’, otherwise the discourse would be infelicitous. If
this discourse was a piece of scene played by some actors and if the actor
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playing C would place the intonation centre on the word ‘killed’, it would
reveal his or her incomprehension of the situation.
The utterance of C is an example of the Actor being in the focus of the
sentence. In case of English the difference can seem minor while it’s in the
intonation and we usually work with a written text. But there are at least
two reasons for considering such a difference as an important one:
1. Intonation is not the only one form to express the function of focus. C
could say for instance ‘It was Lisa who killed him’ or ’He was killed by
Lisa’. And as Kruijff [9] (in chapters 6-8) notes, in some languages the
intonation is not the primary form for expressing the TFA.
2. The meaning of ‘LISA killed him’ really differs from the meaning of
’Lisa KILLED him’. In spite of the fact that in this case the truth
conditions seem to be the same, it is often not the case as example 5.11
shows.
Here is the example. For the sake of completeness there is also the corre-
sponding annotation.
A : Remember the film we saw last week? How Mary killed John?
B : No, it’s not true!
C : That’s right, Lisa killed him.
(5.1)
@r1(remember1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (e1 ∧ 〈Extent〉 every
∧ 〈Rstr〉 (g1
∧ @b1 〈MemberOf〉 g1
∧ @c1 〈MemberOf〉 g1
)
)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (f1 ∧ film1)




∧ 〈Speaker〉 a1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 g1
)
(5.2)
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@s2(see1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (w1 ∧ we1
∧ 〈Extent〉 every
∧ 〈Rstr〉 (g2
∧ @a1 〈MemberOf〉 g2
∧ @b1 〈MemberOf〉 g2




∧ 〈NB〉 s2 ∧ 〈NB〉 e3 ∧ 〈NB〉 l1
∧ 〈Stime〉 (s3 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e3
∧ week1
∧ 〈Rstr〉 (l1 ∧ last1)
∧ 〈Appurtenance〉 s3
)














∧ 〈Actor〉 (m1 ∧Mary1)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (j1 ∧ John1)
∧ 〈Stime〉 s3
∧ 〈Etime2〉 e3
∧ 〈NB〉 m1 ∧ 〈NB〉 k1 ∧ 〈NB〉 j1
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@b2(be1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (k1 ∧ it1)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (t1 ∧ true1)
∧ 〈NB〉 t1
∧ negative
∧ 〈Stime〉 (s5 ∧ 〈P〉 s3)
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e4 ∧ 〈F〉 s5)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e5 ∧ 〈P〉 s5)






∧ 〈Stime〉 (s6 ∧ 〈P〉 s5)
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e6 ∧ 〈F〉 s6)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e7 ∧ 〈P〉 s6)
∧ 〈NB〉 b3 ∧ 〈NB〉 t1




∧ 〈Actor〉 (l2 ∧ Lisa1)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (j1 ∧ he1)
∧ 〈NB〉 l2
∧ 〈Stime〉 (s7 ∧ 〈P〉 s6)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 e3




The topic-focus articulation of each event is annotated by the relation NB.
This relation relates the event with everything in the focus. It may happen
that the relation will connect the event itself.
In the case of example 5.1 the possible variants of TFA could be:
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Now what is the criterion for a nominal to be annotated as NB in an
event:
1. In case of a question everything that the speaker asks about will be
NB:
When did he give you what? (5.9)
@g1(give1




∧ 〈NB〉 e1 ∧ 〈NB〉 p1
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
Do you love him? (5.10)
@l1(love1
∧ 〈Actor〉 y1





∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
5.2 TFA representation 55
Some more examples on questions are 3.50, 3.52, 7.19, 8.3, 8.25, 8.26
and 8.33.
2. In case of a negative sentence everything under the scope of the nega-
tion will be NB1. The examples are 5.11, 3.47, 3.68, 7.11, 7.18, 7.28,
7.32, 8.10 and 8.22.
3. In other cases the information that the speaker present as“new”should
be annotated as NB. Note that this has nothing in common with the
presence of the item in the stock of the shared knowledge—in ‘Lisa
killed HIM’ the Patient is presented as already introduced, but he
is NB. The decision on whether a particular information should be
marked as NB depends strongly on the interpretation. For example
in 3.33 on the page 28: ‘The sun rises in the east.’ In my interpretation
the speaker didn’t want to state that the sun rises. The statement
was rather about the direction from which the sun rises. That’s why I
didn’t encounter the ’rise’ into the focus and let it as a presupposition
(see Hajičová [7] for more about presuppositions and allegations).
At the end of this chapter here is an example of two sentences where the
TFA plays the key role in representing and understanding the underlying
semantics. It is a paraphrase of one of Hajičová’s examples. In spite of the
fact that in the first sentence of 5.11 we can read that ‘We did not win’, it
is not true as the second sentence reveals. Without annotating the TFA we
could not be able to distinguish whether ‘we’ won or not and it is definitely
a difference in truth conditions.
We did not win because of Harry.
It was Peter who scored in the last minute!
(5.11)
1In case of a negative question, it will be annotated as if it was positive.
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@w1 (win1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (w2 ∧ we1
∧ @x1 〈MemberOf〉 w2
)
∧ 〈Patient〉 m1




∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
@sc2(score1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (p2 ∧ Peter1)
∧ 〈Consequence〉 w1
∧ 〈NB〉 p2 ∧ 〈NB〉 l2
∧ 〈Stime〉 (s2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈F〉 s2
∧ 〈Rstr〉 (m2 ∧minute1










In this chapter I will introduce the principle of indexing the propositional
symbols and some of the modalities that should serve to the annotation.
Many of them will have if not the same, then at least similar meaning as
their counterparts in Panevová, Hajičová and Sgall [13].
As Tesnière [22] noticed, a sentence is like a solar system. This holds not
only for the syntax but also for the semantics. We will start in the centre,
classifying verbs, objects and their properties, then some spatio-temporal
modalities are introduced, and in the last section there are some modalities
useful for annotation of associative reference.
6.1 Propositional symbols
The objects and events are represented by nominals, but also described by
propositional symbols. Propositional symbols should be indexed except for
reserved propositional symbols and citation contexts such as in the For-
eignPhrase relation. We should assign 1 to the first occurrence of an ex-
pression and then when we meet the same expression, we must decide whether
its meaning is the same as one of the meanings used before or whether it is
a new one. In the former case we will use the same number, in the latter
we would create a new index by adding 1 to the biggest index used. In this
thesis I use 1 for the “primary”meaning of an expression and higher numbers
in case the expression appears to have another meaning. I chose this strategy
because in this thesis the examples are too small. For instance I use these
indices for some meanings of ‘be’:
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be1 Actor is an instance of Patient
be2 Actor is Where (spatially)
be3 Actor has a property Patient
be4 Actor = Patient
be5 Actor is in Patient (non-spatially)
a
a in a book, in a film, . . .
6.2 Sentence structure modalities
6.2.1 Event properties
Event properties are of two kinds: verbal modality and deontic modality (see
also Panevová, Benešová and Sgall [12]). I added one more modality – text
element modality






hortative have to (as obligation)
volitive want
possibilitive may
permissive be allowed to
facultative be able to
declarative the default
TextElement text the default
heading
note
writing The text is the speakerb
a See section 4.4 for understanding the difference between syntactical conditional and
the conditional EventMod
b See example 8.28 on the page 102.
6.2.2 Event and object modifiers
In this section the inner participants and free modifications are listed. Their
use is the same as on the level of TR. Some of the modifications are left
out because they seem synonymous with relations concerning information
linking.









Attitude gladly, seemly, rightly
Benefactive for who, against who
Criterion in one’s respect
Extent very, a bit, all, two
ForeignPhrase “Veritas in vino.”
Manner quickly
Means by foot
Norm according to rules


















Intent for, in order to




















6.6 Unused TR functors
Panevová, Hajičová and Sgall in [13] distinguish more modalities but for
some reasons they are superfluous for the semantic annotation:
aim (AIM) is equal to Intent.
apposition (APPS) is a syntactical category. It must be annotated ac-
cording to its semantic function.
comparison (CPR) can be substituted by More and Less relations in
combination with Extent. See example 8.21 on the page 97.
complement (COMPL) is only a syntactical category. The expression
will get usually a Rstr relation.
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concession (CNCS) is synonymous with Adversative.
condition (COND) can be modeled using Cause.
confrontation (CONFR) can be substituted by Adversative.
conjunction (CONJ) is the default information link.
counterfactual (CTERF) can be modeled using conditional EventMod
in combination with Cause, see section 4.4 on using conditional.
dependent part of phraseme (DPHR) is used for annotating idioms. In
this thesis the example 7.12 on the page 71 could be considered as a
sketch of future handling of such structures.
difference (DIFF) is the same case as ‘comparison’.
ethical dative (ETHD) is a matter of the style, not of the content. The
stylistic representation of a speech is beyond the scope of this thesis.
heritage (HER) can be modeled using Origin.
intensification (INTF) is also a matter of style. The semantical aspects
of intensification should show up in the TFA representation.
parenthesis (PAR) is replaced by Note.
reason (REAS) is replaced by Cause.
reference to preceding text (PREC) is annotated according to its se-
mantic function with one of ‘information linking’ relations.
restriction (RESTR) is the negation of MemberOf.
result (RESL) can be substituted by Manner and Extent.
rhematizer (RHEM) must be reflected in the TFA representation and its
meaning annotated by some other means.
temp. from when (TFRWH) will become an Etime1 of the entity it
refers to.
temp. parallel (TPAR) can be expressed by use of F and P operators on
Etime1 and Etime2
temp. to when (TOWH) can be expressed using other temporal rela-
tions.
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A Story about Two Sons
Jesus said: I will tell you a story about a man who had two sons.
Then you can tell me what you think. The father went to the older
son and said, “Go work in the vineyard today!” His son told him that
he would not do it, but later he changed his mind and went. The man
then told his younger son to go work in the vineyard. The boy said
he would, but he didn’t go. Which one of the sons obeyed his father?
“The older one,” the chief priests and leaders answered.
Then Jesus told them: You can be sure that tax collectors and pros-
titutes will get into the kingdom of God before you ever will! When
John the Baptist showed you how to do right, you would not believe
him. But these evil people did believe. And even when you saw what
they did, you still would not change your minds and believe.
Matthew 21.28-32
This piece of discourse is adapted as it was on the Internet1. The language
of the example should be ‘contemporary English’. In this chapter I will
try to present an annotation according to the rules presented in this thesis.
Each segment will receive a number and respective representation. I use the
convention to use the segment number for indexing the nominals so that for
every nominal it would be clear where it appeared for the first time. This
convention does not involve the propositional symbols. See section 6.1 for





7.1 65 A story about Two Sons
7.2 65 Jesus said:
7.3 66 I will tell you a story about a man
7.4 66 who had two sons.
7.5 67 Then you can tell me
7.6 67 what you think.
7.7 68 The father went to the older son
7.8 68 and said,
7.9 69 “Go work in the vineyard today!”
7.10 70 His son told him
7.11 70 that he would not do it,
7.12 71 but later he changed his mind
7.13 71 and went.
7.14 72 The man then told his younger son
7.15 73 to go work in the vineyard.
7.16 74 The boy said
7.17 74 he would,
7.18 75 but he didn’t go.
7.19 75 Which one of the sons obeyed his father?
7.20 76 “The older one,”
7.21 76 the chief priests and leaders answered.
7.22 77 Then Jesus told them:
7.23 77 You can be sure
7.24 78 that tax collectors and prostitutes will
get into the kingdom of God
7.25 78 before you ever will!
7.26 79 When John the Baptist showed you
7.27 79 how to do right,
7.28 80 you would not believe him.
7.29 80 But these evil people did believe.
7.30 81 And even when you saw
7.31 81 what they did,
7.32 82 you still would not change your minds




A story about Two Sons (7.1)
@t1(tell1
∧ 〈Actor〉 a1
∧ 〈Effect〉 (st1 ∧ story1
∧ 〈Patient〉 (so1
∧son1




∧ 〈NB〉 st1 ∧ 〈NB〉 so1
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e11 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 e21




∧ 〈Actor〉 (je2 ∧ Jesus1)
∧ 〈Effect〉 ef2
∧ 〈NB〉 je2 ∧ 〈NB〉 sa2
∧ 〈Stime〉 (s2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈F〉 s2)




I will tell you a story about a man (7.3)
@t3(tell1
∧ 〈Actor〉 je2
∧ 〈Effect〉 (st3 ∧ story1
∧ 〈Patient〉 (m3 ∧man1)
)
∧ 〈Addressee〉 y3
∧ 〈NB〉 st1 ∧ 〈NB〉 m3
∧ 〈Stime〉 e2
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e3 ∧ 〈P〉 s3)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 je2 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y3
∧ 〈MemberOf〉 ef2
)
who had two sons. (7.4)
@h4(have1
∧ 〈Actor〉 m3
∧ 〈Patient〉 (so1 ∧ son1
∧ 〈Extent〉 (tw1 ∧ 2)
)
∧ 〈NB〉 h4 ∧ 〈NB〉 so1 ∧ 〈NB〉 tw1
∧ 〈Stime〉 e2
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e4 ∧ 〈F〉 e2)











∧ 〈Stime〉 (s5 ∧ 〈P〉 e2)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e5 ∧ 〈P〉 e3)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 je2 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y3
∧ 〈MemberOf〉 ef2
)






∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e16 ∧ 〈P〉 e3)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 e26




The father went to the older son (7.7)
@g7(go2
∧ 〈Actor〉 (m3




∧ 〈Patient〉 (so7 ∧ son1
∧ 〈Rstr〉 (o7 ∧ old ∧ 〈Extent〉 (m7 ∧more1))
∧ 〈MemberOf〉 so1
)
∧ 〈NB〉 g7 ∧ 〈NB〉 so7
∧ 〈Stime〉 (s7 ∧ 〈P〉 s5)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e7 ∧ 〈F〉 s7)





Note the use of Appurtenance. We should add this modifier in all









∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e8 ∧ 〈P〉 e7 ∧ 〈F〉 s7)











∧ 〈NB〉 g9 ∧ 〈NB〉 i9
∧ 〈Stime〉 e8
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e9 ∧ 〈P〉 e8)







∧ 〈Where〉 (v9 ∧ vineyard1)
∧ 〈When〉 (t9 ∧ today1 ∧ 〈Appurtenance〉 e8)
∧ 〈EventMod〉 imperative
∧ 〈NB〉 v9 ∧ 〈NB〉 w9
∧ 〈Stime〉 e8
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e19 ∧ 〈P〉 e9)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 e29







His son told him (7.10)
@t10(tell1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (so7







∧ 〈Stime〉 (s10 ∧ 〈P〉 s7)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e10 ∧ 〈P〉 e8 ∧ 〈F〉 s10)












∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e11 ∧ 〈P〉 e10)












∧ 〈Stime〉 (s12 ∧ 〈P〉 s10)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e12 ∧ 〈P〉 e10)










∧ 〈Stime〉 (s13 ∧ 〈P〉 s12)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e13 ∧ 〈P〉 e12 ∧ 〈F〉 s13)






The man then told his younger son (7.14)
In this case it is unclear whether ‘then’ refers to e10 or e13. I have chosen the
latter.
@t14(tell1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (m3 ∧man1)
∧ 〈Addressee〉 (so14 ∧ son1




∧ 〈NB〉 so14 ∧ 〈NB〉 t14 ∧ 〈NB〉 y14
∧ 〈Stime〉 (s14 ∧ 〈P〉 s13)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e14 ∧ 〈P〉 e13 ∧ 〈F〉 s14)











∧ 〈NB〉 g15 ∧ 〈NB〉 i15
∧ 〈Stime〉 e14
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e15 ∧ 〈P〉 e14)







∧ 〈Where〉 (v9 ∧ vineyard1)
∧ 〈EventMod〉 imperative
∧ 〈NB〉 w15 ∧ 〈NB〉 v9
∧ 〈Stime〉 e14
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e115 ∧ 〈P〉 e15)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 e215







The boy said (7.16)
@sa16(say1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (so14 ∧ boy1)
∧ 〈Addressee〉 m3
∧ 〈Effect〉 ef16
∧ 〈NB〉 sa16 ∧ 〈NB〉 ef16
∧ 〈Stime〉 (s16 ∧ 〈P〉 s14)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e16 ∧ 〈P〉 e14 ∧ 〈F〉 s16)











∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e17 ∧ 〈P〉 e16)














∧ 〈Stime〉 (s18 ∧ 〈P〉 s16)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e18 ∧ 〈F〉 s18 ∧ 〈P〉 e16)





Which one of the sons obeyed his father? (7.19)
@o19(obey1










∧ 〈Stime〉 (s19 ∧ 〈P〉 s18)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e19 ∧ 〈F〉 s19)










∧ 〈Stime〉 (s20 ∧ 〈P〉 s19)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e20 ∧ 〈F〉 s20)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 g20 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 je2
∧ 〈MemberOf〉 st1
)
the chief priests and leaders answered. (7.21)
@a21(answer1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (g20
∧ 〈MemberOf〉 (p21 ∧ priest1
∧ 〈Rstr〉 (c21 ∧ chief1)
∧ 〈Extent〉 plural
)







∧ 〈NB〉 d20 ∧ 〈NB〉 c21 ∧ 〈NB〉 l21 ∧ 〈NB〉 p21
∧ 〈Stime〉 (s21 ∧ 〈P〉 s19)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (s20 ∧ 〈F〉 s21)









∧ 〈NB〉 t22 ∧ 〈NB〉 ef22
∧ 〈Stime〉 (s22 ∧ 〈P〉 s21)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e22 ∧ 〈P〉 e21 ∧ 〈F〉 s22)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 a1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
∧ 〈MemberOf〉 st1
)
You can be sure (7.23)
@b23(be3
∧ 〈Actor〉 g20




∧ 〈NB〉 su23 ∧ 〈NB〉 p23
∧ 〈Stime〉 e22
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e23 ∧ 〈P〉 e22)





that tax collectors and prostitutes will get into the kingdom of God (7.24)
@g24(get2
∧ 〈Actor〉 (cp24
∧ 〈MemberOf〉 (c24 ∧ collector1
∧ 〈Rstr〉 (t24 ∧ tax1)
∧ 〈Extent〉 plural
)





∧ 〈WhereTo〉 (k24 ∧ kingdom1
∧ 〈Appurtenance〉 (go24 ∧ God1)
)
∧ 〈NB〉 cp24 ∧ 〈NB〉 k24 ∧ 〈NB〉 g24
∧ 〈Stime〉 e22
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e24 ∧ 〈P〉 e22)











∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e25 ∧ 〈P〉 e24)






When John the Baptist showed you (7.26)
@sh26(show2
∧ 〈Actor〉 (j26 ∧ John1 ∧ Baptist1)
∧ 〈Patient〉 p26
∧ 〈Addressee〉 g20
∧ 〈NB〉 sh26 ∧ 〈NB〉 p26 ∧ 〈NB〉 j26
∧ 〈Stime〉 (s26 ∧ 〈P〉 e22)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e26 ∧ 〈F〉 s26)




how to do right, (7.27)
@d27(do1
∧ 〈Actor〉 g20
∧ 〈Patient〉 (r27 ∧ right2)
∧ 〈Manner〉 p26
∧ 〈EventMod〉 conditional

















∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e128 ∧ 〈P〉 e26)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 e228




But these evil people did believe. (7.29)
@b29(believe1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (cp24 ∧ people1





∧ 〈NB〉 b29 ∧ 〈NB〉 ev29
∧ 〈Stime〉 (s29 ∧ 〈P〉 s26)
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e129 ∧ 〈F〉 s29)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 e229










∧ 〈NB〉 se30 ∧ 〈NB〉 p30
∧ 〈Stime〉 (s30 ∧ 〈P〉 s29)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e30 ∧ 〈F〉 s30)










∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e129 ∧ 〈F〉 s30)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e31 ∧ 〈F〉 s30)




































∧ 〈Patient〉 (m34 ∧Matthew1)
∧ 〈NB〉 m34
∧ 〈Stime〉 (s34 ∧ 〈P〉 s2)
∧ 〈Etime1〉 e134
∧ 〈Etime2〉 e234





∧ 〈Patient〉 (ci35 ∧ 〈Rstr〉 (bi35 ∧ bible1)
∧ 〈Rstr〉 (ch35 ∧ chapter1
∧ 〈Identity〉 (i135 ∧ 21)
)
∧ 〈Rstr〉 (ve35 ∧ verse2
∧ 〈Identity〉 (i235
∧ 〈Less〉 (m135 ∧ 28)













Following sentences are provided by Jan Hajič as a “test suite” of a semantic
annotation. I present annotations of each sentence here in this chapter.
Since these sentences are not bound in a context, I always think out the—
in my view—most plausible one. Sometimes I add an explanation of my
understanding of the context. Another representation of these sentences is
offered by Geert-Jan Kruijff in [10].
The nominals in this chapter are in every example independent from those
in other examples because this is not a discourse. The use of the same nominal
in more examples is entirely coincidental and doesn’t mean any semantic




8.1 86 This car is red.
8.2 86 John loves Mary.
8.3 87 Who works for IBM?
8.4 87 Bring the paper!
8.5 88 Peter and Paul go to movies.
8.6 89 Things fall down.
8.7 89 Every squirrel is grey or brown.
8.8 90 He can do it.
8.9 90 We saw three cars.
8.10 91 The students did not eat that food.
8.11 91 Someone named Smith will come tomorrow.
8.12 92 The party that gets the most votes wins.
8.13 92 Nouns correspond usually to entities.
8.14 93 She was seen north of the capital, Cairo.
8.15 93 If I go there, it will be a surprise.
8.16 94 The car was damaged because of the impact.
8.17 94 English is spoken in many countries.
8.18 95 Those people want only independence.
8.19 95 Bill’s house is expensive to take care of.
8.20 96 Jane came earlier than Jim returned from the mall.
8.21 97 Fred is taller than Christopher.
8.22 98 The five of them do not know about the hearing.
8.23 99 After adding 1 pint of milk,
put the mix onto a saucepan.
8.24 100 He went to his dentist first
and then he visited the city centre.
8.25 100 Is Alaska to the west of Mexico?
8.26 101 How can the network be set up?
8.27 101 Penguins - Avalanches 3 : 1
8.28 102 TO THE TOP
8.29 102 Republicans: No majority anymore
8.30 103 ‘Every man is a man’ is a tautology.
8.31 104 Patricia brought it in already yesterday.
8.32 104 The preceding sentence 8.31 is a lie.
8.33 105 What time is it?
8.34 105 She thinks that Dick left for Europe in March.
8.35 106 Don believes that David thinks
that Rebecca will be successful.
8.36 107 ‘Seek’ is a transitive verb.
8.37 107 Seeing is believing.
86
This car is red. (8.1)
The be3 should have the sense of ascribing a property in Patient to the
Actor1. If I wrote @c1red1, I would loose the information that it is the
opinion of x1, not an absolute truth, furthermore there may arise a need to






∧ 〈Patient〉 (r1 ∧ red1)
∧ 〈NB〉 r1 ∧ 〈NB〉 c1
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
John loves Mary. (8.2)
@l1(love1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (j1 ∧ John1)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (m1 ∧Mary1)
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈NB〉 l1 ∧ 〈NB〉 j1 ∧ 〈NB〉 m1
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
1The different meanings of ‘be’ are listed in the section 6.1
87
Who works for IBM? (8.3)
@w1(work1
∧ 〈Actor〉 u1




∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
Bring the paper! (8.4)
@b1(bring1
∧ 〈Actor〉 y1
∧ 〈Patient〉 (p1 ∧ paper1)
∧ 〈WhereTo〉 x1
∧ 〈EventMod〉 imperative
∧ 〈NB〉 b1 ∧ 〈NB〉 p1
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
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Peter and Paul go to movies. (8.5)
This sentence can be understood in two quite distinct ways:






∧ @p1(Peter1 ∧ 〈MemberOf〉 s1)






∧ 〈NB〉 p1 ∧ 〈NB〉 p2 ∧ 〈NB〉 g1 ∧ 〈NB〉 m1
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)






∧ @p1(Peter1 ∧ 〈MemberOf〉 s1)






∧ 〈NB〉 p1 ∧ 〈NB〉 p2 ∧ 〈NB〉 g1 ∧ 〈NB〉 m1
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
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∧ 〈Rstr〉 (t2 ∧ thing1 ∧ 〈Extent〉 plural)
)





∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)




∧ 〈Rstr〉 (s2 ∧ squirrel1 ∧ 〈Extent〉 all)
)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (c1 ∧ 〈MemberOf〉 c2)
∧ @g1(grey1 ∧ 〈MemberOf〉 c2)
∧ @b2(brown1 ∧ 〈MemberOf〉 c2)
∧ 〈NB〉 c1
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
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He can do it. (8.8)
Temporal aspects of such sentence depend strongly on the situation, I left
the interpretation open.
The deontic modality depends on the context, too. It could be also
permissive. This should be clear from the context.
@d1(do1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (h1 ∧ he1)






∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)





∧ @x1 〈MemberOf〉 w1
)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (c1 ∧ car1 ∧ 〈Extent〉 (t1 ∧ 3))
∧ 〈NB〉 t1
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
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The students did not eat that food. (8.10)
The word ‘that’ is reflected in annotation of contextual boundness: In




∧ 〈Rstr〉 (s2 ∧ student1 ∧ 〈Extent〉 plural)
)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (f1 ∧ food1)
∧ negative
∧ 〈NB〉 e1 ∧ 〈NB〉 f1
∧ 〈Stime〉 s3
∧ 〈Etime1〉 e2
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e3 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
Someone named Smith will come tomorrow. (8.11)
If we knew from the context that Mr. Smith shall come to a place other
than of x1, we would annotate the place differently.
@c1(come1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (s1 ∧ 〈Identity〉 (s2 ∧ Smith1))
∧ 〈WhereTo〉 x1
∧ 〈When〉 (t1 ∧ tomorrow1 ∧ 〈Appurtenance〉 s1)
∧ 〈NB〉 s1 ∧ 〈NB〉 c1 ∧ 〈NB〉 t1
∧ 〈Stime〉 s3
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈P〉 s3)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
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The party that gets the most votes wins. (8.12)
@g1 (get1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (p1 ∧ party)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (v1
∧ vote1
∧ 〈Extent〉 (m1 ∧most)
)









∧ 〈Stime〉 (s2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 e2
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
Nouns correspond usually to entities. (8.13)
@c1(correspond1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (n1 ∧ noun1 ∧ 〈Extent〉 every)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (e1 ∧ entity1
∧ 〈Appurtenance〉 n1
)
∧ 〈When〉 (u1 ∧ usually1)
∧ 〈NB〉 n1 ∧ 〈NB〉 c1 ∧ 〈NB〉 e1
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e2 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e3 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
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She was seen north of the capital, Cairo. (8.14)
@s1(see1
∧ 〈Actor〉 a1
∧ 〈Patient〉 (s1 ∧ she1)
∧ 〈Where〉 (p1 ∧ north1 ∧ 〈Appurtenance〉 c1)
∧ @c1(capital1 ∧ 〈Identity〉 (c2 ∧ Cairo1))
∧ 〈NB〉 p1 ∧ 〈NB〉 c1
∧ 〈Stime〉 s2
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s2)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)







∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 e2




∧ 〈Patient〉 (s2 ∧ surprise1)
∧ 〈NB〉 s2
∧ 〈Stime〉 〈P〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e3 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
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The car was damaged because of the impact. (8.16)
In my interpretation the use of ‘because of’ is only a way how to indicate
that ‘impact’ should be in the focus and therefore it is synonymous to ‘The
IMPACT damaged the car.’
@d1(damage1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (i1 ∧ impact1)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (c1 ∧ car1)
∧ 〈NB〉 i1
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
English is spoken in many countries. (8.17)
@s1(speak2
∧ 〈Actor〉 (a1 〈Extent〉 plural)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (en1 ∧ English1)
∧ 〈Where〉 (c1 ∧ country1 ∧ 〈Extent〉 (m1 ∧many1))
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈NB〉 m1 ∧ 〈NB〉 en1
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
95
Those people want only independence. (8.18)
@h1(have1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (p1 ∧ people1 ∧ 〈Extent〉 plural)





∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)





∧ 〈Appurtenance〉 (b1 ∧ Bill1)
)
∧ 〈DeontMod〉 conditional








∧ 〈Patient〉 (e1 ∧ expensive1)
∧ 〈NB〉 e1
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
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Jane came earlier than Jim returned from the mall. (8.20)
See also section 3.3.4 for examples on the past perfect tense.
I use p1 to unify those two places in the clauses. It’s my interpretation
and in a context there may be two different nominals.
@c1(come1




∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
@r1(return1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (j2 ∧ Jim1)
∧ 〈WhereTo〉 p1
∧ 〈WhereFrom〉 (m1 ∧mall1)
∧ 〈NB〉 e1
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈F〉 s1 ∧ 〈P〉 e1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
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Fred is taller than Christopher. (8.21)
@b1(be3
∧ 〈Actor〉 (f1 ∧ Fred1)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (t1 ∧ tall1 ∧ 〈Extent〉 h1)
∧ 〈NB〉 h1 ∧ 〈NB〉 f1
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
@b2(be3







∧ 〈NB〉 h1 ∧ 〈NB〉 c1
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
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The five of them do not know about the hearing. (8.22)
@k1(know1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (ev1 ∧ 〈Extent〉 every
∧ 〈Rstr〉 (f1 ∧ 〈Rstr〉 (t1 ∧ them1
∧ 〈Extent〉 plural
)
∧ 〈Extent〉 (f2 ∧ 5)
)
)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (h1 ∧ hearing1)
∧ negative
∧ 〈NB〉 k1 ∧ 〈NB〉 h1
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
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∧ 〈Material〉 (m1 ∧milk1)




∧ 〈NB〉 a1 ∧ 〈NB〉 p1 ∧ 〈NB〉 m1
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)




∧ 〈Patient〉 (m2 ∧mix1)
∧ 〈WhereTo〉 (p3 ∧ saucepan1)
∧ 〈EventMod〉 imperative
∧ 〈NB〉 p2 ∧ 〈NB〉 p3
∧ 〈Stime〉 (s2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈P〉 e1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
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He went to his dentist first and then he visited the city centre. (8.24)
@g1(go1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (h1 ∧ he1)
∧ 〈WhereTo〉 (d1 ∧ dentist1 ∧ 〈Appurtenance〉 h1)
∧ 〈NB〉 g1 ∧ 〈NB〉 d1
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
@v1(visit1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (h1 ∧ he1)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (c1 ∧ center1 ∧ 〈Appurtenance〉 (c2 ∧ city1))
∧ 〈NB〉 v1 ∧ 〈NB〉 c1
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈F〉 s1 ∧ 〈P〉 e1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
Is Alaska to the west of Mexico? (8.25)
@b1(be2
∧ 〈Actor〉 (a1 ∧ Alaska1)
∧ 〈Where〉 (w1
∧ west1







∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
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How can the network be set up? (8.26)
@s1(set up1
∧ 〈Actor〉 p1






∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
Penguins - Avalanches 3 : 1 (8.27)
An annotator could maybe infer which team was visiting which (and add
Where spec.), but I can’t.
@g1(get1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (p1 ∧ Penguins1)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (r1 ∧ 〈Extent〉 (t1 ∧ 3))
∧ 〈NB〉 t1
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
@g2(get1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (a1 ∧ Avalanches1)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (r2 ∧ 〈Extent〉 (o1 ∧ 1))
∧ 〈NB〉 o1
∧ 〈Stime〉 (s2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s2)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
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TO THE TOP (8.28)
This can be for instance a command of a person in a lift or a writing on







∧ 〈Appurtenance〉 (b1 ∧ 〈Appurtenance〉 x1)
)





∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
Republicans: No majority anymore (8.29)
@h1(have1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (r1 ∧ republican1 ∧ 〈Extent〉 plural)




∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
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‘Every man is a man’ is a tautology. (8.30)
The speaker does not state that every man is a man, therefore I added
the conditional verbal modality. If I didn’t do so, it would mean that the
speaker wanted to say that every man was a man.
@b1(be3
∧ 〈Actor〉 (m1 ∧man1 ∧ 〈Extent〉 every)




∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)









∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
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Patricia brought it in already yesterday. (8.31)
@b1(bring1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (p1 ∧ Patricia1)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (i1 ∧ it1)
∧ 〈WhereTo〉 i2









∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
The preceding sentence (8.31) is a lie. (8.32)
In this case I must do an exception. While in the other examples I al-
ways assume that I start annotating a new discourse and I don’t care about
conflicting nominals, in this example I assume that the annotation is a con-
tinuation of the preceding representation.
@b2(be3
∧ 〈Actor〉 b1
∧ 〈Patient〉 (l1 ∧ lie1)
∧ 〈NB〉 l1
∧ 〈Stime〉 (s2 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime1〉 e1
∧ 〈Etime2〉 e2
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
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What time is it? (8.33)
@b1(be3






∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
She thinks that Dick left for Europe in March. (8.34)
See also example 4.5 on the page 47 on how to annotate hypothetical
events.
@l1 (leave2
∧ 〈Actor〉 (d1 ∧ Dick1)
∧ 〈WhereFrom〉 h1
∧ 〈Whereto〉 (eu1 ∧ Europe1)
∧ 〈EventMod〉 conditional
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈NB〉 m1 ∧ 〈NB〉 l1 ∧ 〈NB〉 d1 ∧ 〈NB〉 eu1
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1
∧ 〈F〉 s1
∧ 〈When〉 (m1 ∧March1 ∧ 〈Appurtenance〉 s1)
)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
@t1(think1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (s2 ∧ she1)
∧ 〈Effect〉 l1
∧ 〈NB〉 l1 ∧ 〈NB〉 t1
∧ 〈Stime〉 s1
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s1)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e1 ∧ 〈P〉 s1)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
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Don believes that David thinks that Rebecca will be successful. (8.35)
@b1(be3
∧ 〈Actor〉 (r1 ∧ Rebecca1)
∧ 〈Patient〉 (s1 ∧ succesful1)
∧ 〈EventMod〉 conditional
∧ 〈NB〉 s1 ∧ 〈NB〉 b1 ∧ 〈NB〉 r1
∧ 〈Stime〉 s2
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈P〉 s2)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 e2
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
@t1 (think1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (d1 ∧ David1)
∧ 〈Effect〉 b1
∧ 〈EventMod〉 conditional
∧ 〈NB〉 t1 ∧ 〈NB〉 d1 ∧ 〈NB〉 b1
∧ 〈Stime〉 s2
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e3 ∧ 〈F〉 s2)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e4 ∧ 〈P〉 s2)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
@b2(believe1
∧ 〈Actor〉 (d2 ∧ Don1)
∧ 〈Effect〉 t1
∧ 〈NB〉 b2 ∧ 〈NB〉 t1 ∧ 〈NB〉 d2
∧ 〈Stime〉 s2
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e5 ∧ 〈F〉 s2)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e6 ∧ 〈P〉 s2)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)
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‘Seek’ is a transitive verb. (8.36)
@b1(be3
∧ 〈Actor〉 (s1 ∧ 〈Identity〉 (s2 ∧ seek))
∧ 〈Patient〉 (v1 ∧ verb1 ∧ 〈Rstr〉 (t1 ∧ transitive1))
∧ 〈NB〉 t1 ∧ 〈NB〉 v1 ∧ 〈NB〉 s1
∧ 〈Stime〉 s3
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈F〉 s3)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 (e2 ∧ 〈P〉 s3)
∧ 〈Speaker〉 x1 ∧ 〈Hearer〉 y1
)














∧ 〈When〉 (a2 ∧ always1)
∧ 〈NB〉 b2
∧ 〈Stime〉 s2
∧ 〈Etime1〉 (e1 ∧ 〈P〉 s2)
∧ 〈Etime2〉 e2
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[13] Panevová, J., Hajičová, E., Sgall. P.(2001): Manuál pro
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